Category: infrastructural aesthetics

  • Infrastructure for being outside

    Infrastructure for being outside

    Perhaps it is the fresh eyes of being somewhere new, but perhaps it is what I always feel on continental Europe, but one thing its hard not to notice the emphasis in the built environment on supporting living well out in the open. This might be the prevailance of trees, of manually built/scaled street infrastructure (steps, walls, pavements, built of hand-sized rock) and the low-managed edge spaces and greenery in this infrastructure. But it is also the adventure parks, the river swimming infrastructure (changing cabins), open access forest with foraging minutes from the city, the BBQs. True, other cities have this. But the space, generosity, openness, and prevalence of these infrastructures of living outside are, like other places in Europe, notable in contrast to the UK (which, as Brett Christophers puts it, has some of the “longest-standing and most ingrained structures of wealth distribution and inequality” Christophers, 2023: 34).

    This contrast with the UK, whose model of social organisation and therefore its ‘public’ realm is based on the stability of a centuries-long model of highly concentrated private ownership (which as Christophers shows is, for those as the sharp end of it, the ‘public’, little changed by the pervasive shift in housing and infrastructure ownership to what he calls asset management society, as exemplified by the Duke of Westminster’s Grosvenor Group (Christophers, 2023; 34)) is useful in as much as one of the noticeable features of the housing infrastructure here is (like much of Europe) its density. This density would, it seems, mandate for a great density and relative volume of public / spatial infrastructure for living: parks, bike paths, open space, leisure, etc. This, of course, tied in with the inheritance of Socialist and Social-democratic political histories anathema to the British ruling class.

    Additionally, something I discussed with the curator here at Rupert, is the deeper integration (cf. the UK) of public rituals or celebrations associated with the ‘natural’ world – in this case, like much of the north, Midsummer and the folk singing Sutartines, which arose out of rural work songs – songs to work to, that are sung as part of the event.

     

     

    *Christophers, B., 2023, Our Lives in Their Portfolios: Why Asset Managers Own the World (London: Verso)

  • Residency post 1 – Harraway – Funny Stories

    Residency post 1 – Harraway – Funny Stories

    This is the first post written while on Residency at Rupert in Lithuania, June 2024. Hopefully, this can be a space for the thinking that happens, but which is outside of the specific things I want to try and get done / written. They can be read as thoughts in formation or as notes towards later texts.

    Perhaps to my own shame, I hadn’t known how funny Donna Harraway is. Last night, I went to a screening of Fabrizio Terranova’s 2016 film-length interview, DONNA HARAWAY: STORY TELLING FOR EARTHLY SURVIVAL at Alt Labs / Sodas 2123 in Vilnius, Lithuania. The film began with Harraway describing at once absurd and mesmerising links and entanglements which, though of a piece with her wider conceptual frameworks of kinship and entanglement, also devolved into the hysterics, the excitement and potential of it all. Of escaping the confines of human-centred epistemologies, ontologies or organisational story. And with this, more specifically, this is those which delimit and confine certain ‘kinds’ or appearances of human as apart from and better than so-called nature, matter, etc.  It was a warmth I hadn’t expected — perhaps foolishly given the rigorously freewheeling nature of her written work — but which created and enacted the conditions for one of Harraway’s central contributions: kinship. I was on board. (The film was made with a friend, a relationship Harraway later cites as being centrally important to her development / thinking / commitments.)

    This warmth also leads a path to the other key themes of the film and Harrway’s work: story telling. Recounting another origin story, Harraway describes a family background and upbringing steeped in story telling and Catholicism. Again, a story steeped in laughter, Harraway talks about the importance and depth of storytelling that is foundational to her upbringing, sitting around the dinner table with her biological family each competing of the best story. Her father, she notes, was sports journalist for The Denver Post. He was not swayed by the glamour or prestige attached to ‘more serious’ topics like crime or business reporting, but wanted to tell ‘the story of the game’. I liked this a lot. That ‘everyday’, collective practices or intensities, or rituals of sport could be the source of so much detail, interest, difference and drama that it would be worth telling and recalling. That one could dedicate a life to its telling, to communicating that intensity, locality and communal narrative. It also helped to ground some of what Harraway would later discuss about the importance of a practice of positively making new things; of telling the specific knots, differences, attachments of this story, of the specific as the site where the general became unstuck and where the specificity of an other wise — ‘it’ — might be found.

    Then, with another bout of perhaps more nervous laughter, she also acknowledges the problems, the power dynamics, the exclusionary, destructive aspects of this story of fascist-adjacent American Catholicism as well as her sometimes messianic attempts to lead the local children on religious missions — using this productively, or at least generatively, to offer an important framing for the role of storytelling and the kinds of kinship that can and must be built. That of inheritance.

    How and why do these things become relevant and come together?

    The artefact of film itself offers something of the texture and implications of Harraway’s work. Difficult to tell at first, but Harraway, who is talking to Terranova off camera, is filmed against a green screen and superimposed against footage of her house and office. The backdrop begins to pan disorientingly with Harraway appearing, doubled and at work in the background, or else with jellyfish floating behind or the room switching location at will or dropping out of shot. These parallel or simultaneous realities are heightened by archival footage of Harraway, her friends, or tongue in cheek TV lectures, or science fiction imagery collaged into the centre of the frame. Of course, you might say: these quasi-structuralist, post modern techniques of film making are of a piece with the digital era of hyper-situated, circulatory and disoriented story telling that often characterise contemporary visually-speculative narrative modes. (Indeed, the film’s director co-runs a masters in speculative and experimental story telling at Brussels’ ERG – School of Graphic Research.) Alongside this, through, the interview contained, for me, some key ideas and questions about what story telling might do in and to the world, and how.

    Stories and kinship

    I enter this having an interest in the ways that narrative can in the words of Meike Bal act as a motor or assembling device in a story (1999). For me, this can helpfully transposed to the repeating anticipatory narratives and practices of cause and effect that make up and hold together infrastructure; an infrastructure (and its transformation) is nothing without an animating story, purpose, outcome. That is, stories hold an infrastructural world up and keep it practically bound to itself (Rossiter 2017). Narrative can be an effective analytic and expository device when considering the often difficult to ascertain totality of infrastructure.  It is especially used by environmental humanities and STS to convey the integration and significance of parts and constituents of active assemblages and the ways that they are situated and relevant (see Star 1999, Bowker 1994, Green (2020). It can also be a means of breaking and making other ways of being and doing together, at meso-scales since stories are one way that the anticipatory meaning and practices that allow infrastructure to be understood to show up as and where expected (Thrift 2004) become expected, relied upon (Berlant 2001). That is, narrative is one way in which the form that comprises infrastructure circulates to become a genre (Berlant), becomes habituated or relied upon (e.g., the ‘democratisation’ of information is how online platforms are woven deeply into everyday life becoming effective surveillance machines). The task, as is echoed/clarified by Harraway here, is to change the kinds of story that hold things together and what, and how and what can circulate so that how a world repeats or endures is different too. (On a damaged planet this is ever more important.) So what did Harraway say about stories?

    To begin with, stories are key for Harraway to the possibility of other ways of being, for intensities to be felt, communicated, known and modelled; for them to become ritualised and to support collective being. She gives the instance of marriage, which though not at all suitable to the forms of kinship and family she lived and wanted, were all they had. They did a job, but were at the same time limited / limiting. This lead in Harraway’s story and work to a desire and commitment to find, tell, create other kinds of story; or redistribute the narrative (Harraway 1986). Towards the end of the film, Harraway narrates a sci-fi inflected story of another kind of kinship and biological entanglement: parenting is not limited to reproductive parents and at birth one is given a cross-species kin, or symbiont with which one will live and inhabit the world with. In this telling, the character lives in symbiosis with a monarch butterfly. While pronounced female at birth, the character decides she wants a beard. Because, in this story, the character lives with a symbiont, she chooses that this beard be of Monarch butterfly antennae rather than hair. A radically different story of what a family or kinship is, does and how it mediates relationships to the world, developing such shared, cross-species intensities are part of how Harraway instantiates the conditions of a wider project of imagining and exploring real and speculative non-extractive ways of doing and undoing. Of living on a damaged planet in ways that demand and enable other kinds of negotiation.

    In contrast with this — or maybe towards this — she also discusses the dangers of stories becoming universal; of the power vested and invested in keep those stories universal or generally-applicable. Capitalism, capitalocene are discussed; their absurdity and violence is in their status as the only way of telling the story of human-earthly life — for those invested in it and those whose critique of it excludes any other way of thinking. (We need marxism/ists, but other ways of knowing too.) This occurs for critical terms too. Chulthocene, Anthropocene, are useful and limited, and in the case of the former a bit of a joke. They do the job, yet they risk becoming total, their difference becoming meaningless. The importance of this non-generallisablity is that it is allows for and is situated within the ways of being, doing, communing that are not repeated to the extent of becoming self-same, exclusionary, against alterity, entirely synthetic to a world of otherness. Rather, this specificity requires an ongoing negotiability; and a connected, recognition that in a dynamic, interconnected, and processual world of systemic and ecological interaction and niches, doing must also be about undoing. About living in the compost. (Here, to stay with the trouble is to stay with these edges: where the exclusion happens, but also the site where negotiation must — echoing Tsing’s concept of non-scalability.)

    Ways of doing and undoing

    So, while stories offer a conceptual frame for how ways of doing and being are known and held together, they also indicate or reveal the significance or consequence of the specificity those stories, particularly as they attach to objects or others and despite the tendency of some stories to become a generalisation. Why? The concept and actuality of inheritance, for instance, shows for Harraway the consequence of stories of and as ways of doing as they clash, negotiate, come into contact with others. Holding a Navaho woven basket she, as a white, American woman, inherits a brutal history of genocide on the indigenous American populations that means she must reflect on what it means to hold that basket in her hands. She inherits the story and impact of Catholicism in this place in this sense too. But turning to her dog, who is experiencing the onset of dementia and whose barks for comfort interrupt the filming, she also inherits a history of species companionship that allows her to comfort her dog, to make good on a relationship.

    Between these specific instances, we find the tensions that can be set up in how stories and how we inherit them. That is, as ways of knowing and doing attach us destructively, generatively, abrasively, etc., into communities of others, and what might be called worldings — where such stories are generalised and enforced as the parameters and limits of shared or proximate existence. On the one hand, she holds and possesses an on object whose cosmology is dramatically at odds with the stories of conquest she inherits; on the other is a story of shared intensity of experiences whose inherited features (companionship, mutual training and responsiveness) cannot be fully known or defined and which generate ongoing mutual dependence. This tension is, then, posed in a non-reparative sense (Berlant, 2016), as a call to be attentive to and to tell and create moments or stories of specific attachment and entanglement. Not as representation in general, but as a part of a commitment to alternative ways of living. To living with the inheritance of a damaged planet which must be negotiated ongoingly as a reality and as a strategy of flourishing with it. This is a serious commitment.

    Family-making and telling is, for instance, such a commitment. To be with, to support, to care for and to be cared for is a lifetime commitment and a serious one: especially when that family and kin are outside of the reproductive family, social norms, or species kinship, such as Harraway’s. It requires, rituals for those ways of being and of dying. This commitment to making and unmaking, telling and retelling, knowing and unknowing of rituals or ways of attachment and doing / undoing is both provided for and key to the metaphor and actuality of what Harraway calls living in the compost  / staying with the trouble. That is, at once it negotiates and embroils us in the ways we must make as well as share and use the resources of a much wider ecosystem or assemblage of beings and needs; and that this pivoting towards both a wider net and a balance between giving and taking is the only way we can live, indeed maybe flourish, on a planet so damaged by extraction and capitalism.

    These terms, of analysis and of a generative philosophy of a good life inspired by and out of this situation clarify and are clarified by the method or practices that it emerges from and what can be taken from it. Specifically, I am thinking of on the one hand the biography of Harraway and these ideas; she tells of building a house, garden and family whilst writing — and of writing only in the summer because teaching take the best of you. These activities, grounding and reflective, creative and iterative are key to understanding how other ways of doing and undoing might be realised. That is, through thinking and making; and making in order to give thinking life in its having to negotiate the assemblage it becomes a part of and which one must make ideas into. And on the other, a more generally-applicable lesson for the relationship of theory / practice proposed and articulated  here together; we need a direction of travel / analysis & iteration that instantiates critical positions / propositions, and a positive, creative act which activate and which mediate / modulate the possibilities that theory / ideas imagine. What might be reality is made out of concrete contact with what already is. This changes what has been, and is the only way that something else might be. The last words to Harraway:

    And yet the only the way to come into grips, to come into presence of it, … is to constantly keep doing positive things; you have to keep trying to make an experiment work. You have to keep writing this particular story, not some story in general, but this story. You have to do this. Be here, not everywhere. You have to be attached to some things, not everything. The only possible way is if again and again and again if we engage each other in doing something [laughs].

    Watch:

    Donna Haraway : Story Telling for Earthly Survival / Trailer / Fabrizio Terranova / 2016 from Atelier Graphoui on Vimeo.

    Thus, this story is of how to create difference; to get to groups with it — that is, what is not the abstraction, but what is real, the trouble, the compost — the possibility of living outside the generalisation. The uncertainty of not being able to give or allocate a name to something offers the possibility of new meaning or practice. This requires the thinking of at least two temporalities or trajectories: the reflective and compositional and the grounded and mattered; or, to adapt Cornelius Castoriadis (as I did in my PhD), to imagine and institute, with the productive tension between them the stakes and what is at stake. Between these dimensions of story telling — narrative and the telling; repetition and inheritance —  is where the negotiation and being with happens, that is, the ongoing negotiated co-existence necessary to living and flourishing with others. Important now more than ever.

    For me, some open questions remain as to how this fares when in contact with structures for shared, common existence, however.

    Infrastructural imaginaries (to redistribute the narrative)

    A main question is one reflecting on the particularity of infrastructure, as that which must be known — or narrated — in advance if it is to be recognised as coherently infrastructural. Admittedly, Harraway is not discussing infrastructure here; however, the centrality of narrative to infrastructure, and of ways of doing and undoing Harraway discusses to how we might think about infrastructure means I can ask this question of the relevance of these ideas of story as they attach to, interface with, negotiate the category of things and practices that are infrastructural and, indeed, which must be also changed if the bigger project Harraway poses of living well is to be realised.

    Specifically, this is the question of how to realise and sustain the conditions for these other kinds of life in dimensions outside of the personal or individual, familial or domestic (in its baggiest sense). This is not a difference in kind per se ‚— i.e., stories and inheritance play similar roles to those of anticipation and expectation of infrastructure — though the difference in scale, temporality, composition or location in infrastructures emphasise the question of distributing agency outside of the human story teller (which is nonetheless central to Harraway’s story here) more acute. That is, to reflect on the structuring dimensions of inheritance as the means of sharing that way of doing and undoing. And to be yet more specific, I am referring to how narrative or story-telling might, in a creative, positive sense might interact critically with the temporality of the loop of infrastructure. Both looping in advance of its realisation and as its reality (see PhD). In many ways, this is academic. Story telling enacts its own infrastructures of possibility through the device of narrative (Bal). But how this relates to or relays with both the practices and epistemologies this enables (Harraway) and the systemic arrangements, work (Carse / Bowker) and how these negotiations are ongoigingly negotiable/negotiated (Carse / Verran) and Configurable (Suchman) remains key to the durablity of these propositions as liveable and sustainable in a planetary sense.

    The setting of creation and instituting

    Another question is of the locus or agent of story telling and doing in Harraway’s work — at least as articulated in this film. (More work is to be done on checking this, of course.) For instance, the stories told here are ones of individuals interacting and deciding on how to live. For instance, choosing to model ones own body with Monarch antennae; the playfulness in kin making through symbiont from birth. The units are small and so there is a tension with the larger scales of relationship / relation that is some how un-addressed. Perhaps intentionally; but not sufficiently for my project. Here, then, I depart from Harraway’s approach, which like a lot of North American (post-Western) theory departs with an idea that individuals make themselves into a world, rather than a European one which imagines itself into or out of an already extant (and in many cases a priori / fundamental worlding, ontology, epistemology, etc., e.g., language, humanist, rationalist, etc.

    Instead, I depart with the notion or inheritance of infrastructure, or infrastructure-like ways of negotiating being and doing in common as the meso-scalar unit or site for how we create into, know/sense and account for the shared, collective experiences of being in an environment with others. Of course, one could imagine radically non-human ways of being. However, in the same way that non-human organisms and matter creates structures or systems of existence and persistence, infrastructure is what we refer to when we refer to those initiated by humans. (I also blur this definition with institutions, which, like patterns in cognition are where certain kinds of meaning are stabilised, anticipated and recognised.) Infrastructure is thus, like the house or theory or family Harrawyay built(ds), a locus of thinking, support structure and interface with others /other beings / negotiation. As noted above, to centre infrastructure requires that we think about narrative in particular ways. This does not contest Harraway’s ideas discussed here, however. Rather, I think it offers a complimentary discussion of how we might address ideas of scale, scope, sustainability, or stability of such stories / ways of doing, whilst being attentive to the closure / generalisation that is an inherent risk in infrastructure. That is how to infrastructure with the trouble; to compost, do and undo infrastructure and the stories that tell it / it tells; to unbuild it as Halberstam might argue.

     

    Redistributing the narrative.

    To be imagined by infrastructure / imagine infrastructure is a way then of framing another aspect of how and why to redistribute the narrative; the purpose and location of other kinds of story telling. Do we need to address those ways of being imagined by infrastructure: post-truth, more than human sensing, knowing and the artefacts of the Anthropocene? To some extent, to know and think about where we are remains importnat; but Harraway’s project also provokes or is centred by the more foundational problem of sustaining shared life, and doing this well. The question then might be, do these complexities or their analysis support that foundational problem? Do we need to know about these in order to undo or unbuild them? Perhaps in order to unmake the cultural conditions or socio-technical  in which they are genre or at least plausible as such.

    Why as these questions? Because to sustain new ways of doing and undoing requires new kinds of narrative, character, story to be not only told and retold, but to be anticipated, expected, repeated as a ground on which that doing and undoing can endure. A non-sovereign relationality or proxemics made possible (Berlant 2016) in the ways stories allow for other kinds of orientation (Ahmed) to be sensed, known in those ways of doing and undoing; one which allows for the decomposition of that inheritance.

    Perhaps this is exactly the role of the curatorial, to enable, support, imagine, assemblage the cultural, socio-technical performativity or rituals that will make other kinds of land use, kinship imagined, imaginable and institutable; and, following this, durable, sustainable and yet transformable. (Here Castoriadis’ turn to ecology and autopoeisis is interesting.)

    This text is longer than expected. But clarifies and helps to weave a number of threads that I have been considering. Specifically as to the point and articulation of a practice that crosses academic, curatorial and writing/creative practice; of the relationship between infrastructures to cultural / more than human settings, and the kinds of conceptual / performative devices through which these are known, sensed, repeated and inherited, such as narrative and configuration.

    Thanks must be given to my host organisation as this research and time has been supported by Rupert.

    x

    12-6-2024

  • Diagrams — draft: the art stack, attempt 1 — 3.

    Diagrams — draft: the art stack, attempt 1 — 3.

    Really basic draft of an art stack, a base layer for a workshop, and centring on the question of conditions for scalability for the exhibition: why it is required to be, and how it is kept in certain scalable forms — and how we might be begin to work on other scales, scalar patterns, and interrelations than those which determine repeatable, scalable forms such as the exhibition and art works. Addressing these questions are central to the ability of art to intervene on infrastructural imaginaries, and assemblages. 

    Required for context:

    – Anna Tsing’s work on scalability: the ability to expand without changing basic elements: https://read.dukeupress.edu/common-knowledge/article-abstract/18/3/505/6827/On-NonscalabilityThe-Living-World-Is-Not-Amenable?redirectedFrom=fulltext

    – https://arts.ny.gov/how-applications-are-evaluated

     

    (developed while working on a text about Scalability, Infrastructural Speculation and the Scalability project. https://www.airgallery.org/exhibitions/scalability-project-for-information)

  • Diagrams – moving through the pattern, infrastructural performativity – 2. Infrastructure as practice

    Diagrams – moving through the pattern, infrastructural performativity – 2. Infrastructure as practice

    In this working diagram I attempt to explore how we might model (at a level of great of abstraction) the performative practicing of infrastructure. (It is developed in chapter 2.) This model is a departure from approaches to infrastructure that look to represent or describe anthropological effects, material/media conditions and consturctions for infrastructure, or to assemblages to abstract and describe infrastructure in ways that tie manifestation of infrastructure to specific conditions at the cost of a general model; looking to practice as a means of jointing these fields and opening up the knotty question of what it means to invent infrastructure  (See also Easterling, Bratton, Munoz, Harun Morrison, What can a garden be, New Art Ecologies)

    Infrastructure as practice – Tom Clark. (Originally drafted in conversation with Susannah Haslam in the context of a project for adpe working group: https://artdesignpolicyeducation.art)

    Where infrastructure is an assemblage in form, organisation and operation, so too must the diagramming of how infrastructure is conjured according to expectations about its availability, operation, reliable form, and to whom it is addressable. What is pictured above is an attempt at describing how various parts of infrastructure come together — in myriad ways — to keep infrastructure held together, often against dynamics within or caused by each part. Roughly, it is the performative and temporally, spatially and informationally circular relationship created between the imagined outcome, organisation and transition across the uncertain scale of an infrastructure and the manifestation of each of these factors with that imaginary holding in place that is the basis for infrastructure bing able to exist: since it is circular, where the conditions of existing must continue for certain forms of relational, contextual, information, technological and ecological existence to persist, it is the basis of a repetition that can be either (and most often) standardising, normative and tending towards transition or convention, or (more tricky, and for instance the subject of power relations, such as in ‘disruption’) the basis for invention and difference in repetition. This latter part is explore further below.

    Diagramming infrastructure in this way develops the work of Lauren Berlant (2016; 2001) on infrastructure as pattern and on the circulation of form in order that it become genre, where anticipation and expectation require training before being naturalised as ground. It also pulls on the work of Thrift (2004) who joints the work of Berlant (2001) and Butler (Gender Trouble) to suggest a specific kind of performativity is registered in the particularly relational patterns of infrastructure, as relating to a technological unconsciousness. For Thrift, this technological unconsciousness can be through of as a circular cicurlation of form and expectation, carried out through for instance a sense of addressing and addressability that connects the parts of an infrastructure in how it is used and thought. To transit across an infrastructure we must have an address that we aim for, this address must be knowable to a user, and to the system; hence, to be infrastructural (a system or a user) requires addressability, internally and externally.

    This relationship is represented in the diagram by the cicualtiey between ideal and actual users (but which could also represent use, outcome, process etc.,) as they pass through the organisational and object model (which come together as certain patterns). This addressability can, however, also constrain what is possible in the technological unconsciousness through, for instance, standardisation aimed at making addressing more efficient and predictable. As such, the circular relationship between expecting and enacting infrastructure is performative insofar as this movement through that patterning is both anticipatory and enacts what is anticipated: other wise the organisational work of infrastructure (Geoffry in Carse), would collapse. The provisional unity of infrastructure (Berlant) would not hold and infrastructure would cease to offer a transition across the meso-scale, spatially, temporally, or informationally. It would in Star’s terms be fully contradictory with its intentions, rather than simply invested with desire, master narrative and embedded practices that seems to contradict the hopes of infrastructural designers, and therefore through which this performativity takes place (1999).

    It is this performative, or at least circular relationship that enacts infrastructure that is often most difficult to describe in the conventional models in the humanities and arts, since by relying on cause and effect, instrumentality, relationality, assemblage and pattern, it precludes the kinds of agency on which analytical concepts of invention and critique are built. Nonetheless, by grounding the relational modelling of infrastructure — often diagrammed in Deleuzean assemblage, or measured in cognitive science (Hayles, 2017) — in the specificity of form, event, or image as offered in the arts and humanities, we can begin to pin point this relational model (as for instance pattern), to differentiate it, and to invent it.

    Finally then, the user, or the movement through pattern offers a variable which animates, traces, and potentially disrupts the patterning of infrastructure. Wright (2013), Bratton (2015), Rossiter (2017) and Chun (2011) have focused on the user as a point at which the rules (or repeating conditions and contexts) that hold together an infrastructure, suggesting this is both a submissive and potentially disruptive figure. On the one hand the as Rossiter and Chun describe, the user is required to submit to the expectations and rhythms of infrastructure into access it, thereby shaping their experience of reality. On the other however, as Bratton and Wright hint, this places a lot of emphasis on actors who are constituted but these infrastructures (meaningless without it) and who constitute these infrastructures; as such there is scope for Bratton and Wright to mis use and remodel this use — if we are willing to engage in the relational, instrumental terms of infrastructure seriously and comittedly.

    Brought together, these factors raise questions on infrastructural agency and forms of disruption, how we might differentiate . Seen in Condorelli, Tsing is a need to contrast outcome, intention, form, shape, normativity. For Condorelli, the normally invisible conceptual, physical and labour infrastructures that scaffold the visibility of art offer an opportunity to highlight and rethink the relationship between the supporter and supported through notions of limited duration, supplementary, being brought up against or into proximity with others (2009). While for Condorelli this is relationality is built on top of an ethical framework built around the dynamics of authorship and participation baked into art critique, and as such is ultimately built around representational model of ethics, Tsing offers a relational comparison between scalability and nonscalability (2012). Built around standardisation of business expansion that allows the unchanging scaling up of a project or activity, regardless of the consequences for the contexts, ecologies, or conditions that scaling up affects, scalability is for Tsing, to be contrasted with forms of nonscalability activity which resist, inhibit, enable and complicate scalability. The difficulty for this model is how to make infrastructure where repetition and transitional scales do not rely on standardisation; how to make difference the internal driver and support of infrastructure. However, by, bringing together this dynamic practicing of infrastructure also here suggests it is the dynamic, meso-transitional combination of these two ideas.

    This leads to a second set of diagrams, where these relationship and movements are more scattered, less repetitive — whether by arrangement of parts, or by bringing into tension, one assemblage (or stack) with another, or by staging other kinds of meaning (imaginary) into these assemblages, or where movement through is itself patterned, imagined or conditioned differently — in order that difference immanent to infrastructure can be both given form and differentiated.

    How would this look in practice? A key example I have explored is the work of Forensic Architecture and its staging in exhibition formats.

    Where exhibition is our frame of reference, the proposal by FA represents a relatively self-contained and reductive model of possibility: a series of reports, timelines, videos and diagrams present a representation of an assertion or claim of truth, based on data extracted and assembled using architectural models.

    However, where we view this assemblage as an intervention whose scale and scope extends both beyond the art stack and intervenes in / interoperates with other infrastructures and stacks then the lines of transition and meso-scalar meaning are vastly more complex, and inter/intra-penetrate with multiple other  modes / levels of meaning, staging, and practicing. (simply if we take an intersectional viewer of those coming into contact with it seriously this is the case.) We can begin to see this interrelationship with even a simply diagram of some footed infrastructural inter- / intra-dependencies of the work.

    The question developed in the third chapter is specifically what this difference between representational and relational modes of staging and meaning are, and how, within a framework for infrastructural meaning, critical changes can be made. This will for instance mean the repetition rather than just inclusion of difference as a motivation of change; it will also mean thinking other modes of challenge and visibility to the infrastructural to those used in the critique of institutions: diagrammed below.

    Classically, institutional critique can be summed up by 1. adjusting the meaning of the institution, where actors already inside seek to remake it via incorporation of an outside; 2. expressing the rub of incorporation into the institution for an actor who was outside; 3. by what or whom it excludes (these latter two are deeply informed by Foucault’s Knowledge and Power); 4. by escaping the institution. This forth approach, which generates it energy from the previous three, is often tied to either a life without institution, or by re-imagining it.

    It is this final movement, of fleeing the institution to live without formalised institution, or to self-institute that I am principally interested in contrasting to an approach to complexification, change, re-making, patterning. etc., of the ‘movement’ or ‘transition’ through the meso-scale of infrastructure as represented by the pink arrows below:

    The difference established for infrastructure will therefore depend on the development of an approach to thinking infrastructure as a practice that is more easily diagrammed as above, than described.

     

     

     

  • Diagrams – indicators, levels, methods of close not deep, process – 1. Ngam

    Diagrams – indicators, levels, methods of close not deep, process – 1. Ngam

    In this series of posts I am publishing/sharing some working and research diagrams which are helpful in articulating some key problems and methodological questions when researching infrastructure. While they relate to general questions when studying infrastructure, I am especially interested in how they can be and indeed must be developed for the increasingly complex, systemic infrastructures of staging, publicising, meaning making and mediation as they interpenetrate with the cultural infrastructures of the field of art, design and architecture.

    These problems are familiar, if not fully discussed in the frame described above, and include:

    • The problem of indicators and levels (Star, 1999). Or, how at each level of infrastructural operation or action, a different kind of indicator is necessary, eve if the overall infrastructure is a combination of all these layers. For instance, we can think about infrastructure as an artefact; or as a trace or recording of activities, where the infrastructure is also an information collecting device; or it could be a representation of a / the world. (Star, 1999, 387–388)
    • The need to read with the action of infrastructure, getting close but not deep (Love, 2010) in order to move with and across these levels. As soon as one tries to fix in and read into or interpret an infrastructure as an object, it ceases to be actively infrastructural (a point also made by Easterling, 2016), and we can no longer see what it does, how its through put patterns the world (Berlin, 2016), or its effect as a relation to its process.
    • Understanding and articulating the information and meaning of infrastructure as a process rather than quality, processes inherent to infrastructure, but not mutually exclusive to other forms of meaning (Hayles, 2017), and reflecting on an representing the action and outcomes of these ways of thinking, meaning-making, staging and so on.

    Note: these diagrams are exploratory and primarily concern methodological questions. They are not necessarily to be considered ‘findings.’

    The first is a series of ngrams using Google (https://books.google.com/ngrams), which measure the frequency of word usage in language corpuses. (I began thinking about this kind of pattern recognition as research method for infrastructure in a workshop series on digital humanities for the arts “Arts and Humanities in the Digital Age”: https://chasedigitalage.wordpress.com.)

    They are certainly research prompts at this stage. A place holder.

  • Fragmentation and denial

    This is really only a note, but I wanted to get something down before forgetting. It has to do with the capacity for denial that comes with infrastructure: this comes with both the notion of infrastructure as a unified, “seamless” whole (see: Rossiter, 2017, xvii); and that infrastructures rather create a fragmented series of worlds which can be reassembled as “accidental” wholes. (See Bratton, 2015, 8)

    Both of these states are facilitated by the principle/constraint iterable inter-operability that means infrastructures can function with each other, and with other things. However, since this inter-operation is scalable concept, as in all sites, instances, or scales of infrastructural entities must be equally operable or executable within the infrastructural system for it to work* (see: Infrastructure as Code; Keller Easterling on architecture becoming via infrastructure a repeatable formula or software to be rolled out (2016, 11–12); or, execution as social function — both in terms of performing punishment and enacting bureaucracy, where execution “always relates to the now, to an actualization, a presence which is always already over.”Critical Software Thing, “Execution,” Posthuman Glossary, 2018, 142), it has to be understood that infrastructure produces an internal wholeness, that tends towards a conceptual horizontality, to which meaning within that horizon becomes completely immanent. That is to say, infrastructure enacts a reality that is sovereign, and thus denies — or allows the denial — of all that is beyond it.**

    Of course how this intersects with institution creates power dynamics, and vertical arrangements of decision and consequence that must also be considered, nonetheless, the point is here that infrastructure allows a denial of its constitutive outside whether that infrastructure is of a fabled or practical whole or totally fragmentary and small. As Ned Rossiter has written on the subject of logistics (which as an infrastructural model can be translated at the level of method): “The logistic imaginary disavows the political. Let us be sure, this world has not gone away but rather persists as the constitutive outside to the logistical fantasy of seamless interoperability.” (Rossiter, Software, Infrastructure, Labour, 2017, xvii)

    Thus, this points initially at the need for a theory of infrastructure that incorporates this structural non-unity at the macro scale. (see Bratton; Critical Software Thing, 2018, 143, column 2.) This is also distinct to the idea of network theory in which nodes of a network can be distinct so long as they agree to the protocols and procedures that grant access to being realised within that network; rather this speaks to an idea that the node can actually be actually a full, self-realised, self-aware reality, to which externalities must conform in order to enter.

    It is also important to set this within a context in which totalisation and denial can be deployed as political content and its ground. That is to say, how can infrastructural platforms be used to deny political, social, or environmental realities, as well as to affirm others; to do this with the seeming ability to accommodate the (apparently) exact opposite — the predominance of Facebook in platforming and affording capacity to far right wing political groups; and offering all the ability to deny their constitutive outside, despite their parallel and potentially, partially overlapping co-existence,*** and to allow the fantasy of becoming and operating as if they were already a total space — which structurally as the means of interfacing the world, these platforms are.

    Secondly, to return to the question of the execution of these infrastructures as worlds, is the power of this infrastructure of denial, not simply to allow one to turn away, but specifically to deny the existence or even actualisation of that political other in the first place. To return to the idea of execution as expressed by Critical Software Thing:

    “As an effectuation of a sentence, execution always relates to the now, to an actualization, a presence which is always already over. Execution in this instance then is not dying, but specifically to be deprived of being. It is not deceasing, nor is it homicide, it is death by punishment. It is a sudden death forced upon a body of punishment which has no control over the violence executed by the system. In these iconic self-presencing actualisations [public executions], we are made to witness execution’s quality as an event, an act of a juridical, political, technical or biological discourse enacted decisively upon its sentenced subject.” (Critical Software Thing, 2018, 142)

    We might therefore say, execution as “the actualization and execution of a system into an instance of discourse,” (Critical Software Thing, 2018, 142) or in lived reality, expresses the denial of being of one as a positive expression of another. Here, I want to return to a previous post on the work of Forensic Architecture and the question of indexing (or the addressing of bodies within an infrastructural reality to Bratton’s term, 2015, 9–10) Discussing their work The Left to Die Boat, Central Mediterranean Sea, 27 March 2011, I posited that Forensic Architecture, were making visible the ways in which the infrastructure of both the European Union’s political system and its border force Frontex, indexed migrants as external to, and thus deniable to the infrastructural permissions required of citizenship, contrasting these with those of a gallery visitor watching.

    It would seem from the perspective here, however,  Forensic Architecture’s work to bring put events into a public sphere would be to bring them out of deniability and to recognise these events, not as unfortunate consequences, but as a deliberate act for that public. That is as “an actualization” of infrastructural power: These are people “not dying, but specifically [being] deprived of being,” where infrastructural enactments are acts “of a juridical, political, technical or biological discourse enacted decisively upon its sentenced subject.” (Critical Software Thing, 2018, 142) Forensic Architecture’s use of the public sphere is key in destabilizing the distancing possible in an infrastructural distribution of power, that is emphasizing the various dimensions of intimacy and proximity of what Rossiter calls the “remote intimacy” of infrastructure. (2017, 139) ****

    To pull this discussion fully into art would seem trite. However, the question remains as to how art as a practice can substantiate a reality, as well as substantiate alternative ones: and how this occurs at functional (instrumentalised), institutional, economics, aesthetic levels. Forensic Architecture offer one example. Where denial as an infrastructural reality is both whole and fragmentary, it is therefore a selective reality, one which is selectively cooperative.

    When autonomy as locale is increasingly problematic form this simply structural sense, for instance, could this remodelling, and potentially disarticulation of deniability through art also look something like the school French architect  Xavier Wrona has proposed in order to generate a counter-right wing material culture in the infrastructurally diminished areas of France in which Le Pen took hold in the 2017 presidential elections? To what extent art participates in or rejects the selective cooperation of infrastructural wholes is therefore a key facet of any criticality it might claim.

    end of note …

    * Here, we might see further work on the notion of scale, and the propensity to see infrastructural at large scale: that is in order for something to be recognised as infrastructural it would seem that it needs to be able to scale, and therefore can only be recognised as such, if it has reached this scale. Easterling’s concept of disposition might be helpful here (as in the disposition of those constitutive parts or those who do / can enter); as it Amaro’s work on precognition and the confirmation bias of algorithmic prediction which acts in advance of computation, but only to confirm biases based on past (most often cultural) biases. It would be especially useful to follow on from Amaro’s recent work as he discussed at the Animate Assembly 9 at Goldsmiths, (11 Jan 2019) around the splitting of identities or a quantum self.

    ** On the notion of constructing an infrastructural agency as sovereign within itself, see also Critical Software Thing on the computational “cut” that makes the analogue world readable in code and code time, in, “Execution,” Posthuman Glossary, 2018, 143, column 2 – 144, column 1. “Such cuts — execution performed by computation — … can be compared to what Karan Barad refers to as ‘agential cuts’ (2007: 429). They are made in the name of a certain agency; in the case of computer code, a computational agency.” This work on execution as the creation of an actual now, out of the virtuality of a system is key to describing infrastructure as a conceptual/imaginary form of consequence, not simple concretised abstraction in the literal sense of the word concrete.

    *** cf. Arch one-time No Deal-Brexitier Jacob Rees-Mogg re-tweeting a video of a AFD co-leader’s speech to the German Parliament, in which she argues for allowing a broadened single market closer integration with the UK in the terms of exit; at once contradicting the Brexit mantra of global Britain not needing to partner with the EU, just going without a deal, and speaking to a facist exclusion of all non-German or non-northern European countries, this speech and its retweeting indicates both parallel realities and the combination of certain elements of that reality: which in practice points an attempt by Rees-Mogg’s to bridge a fascist reality between the two countries.

    **** I wouldn’t easily go so far as to fully extend the comparison with Critical Software Thing’s analogy: rather the function of infrastructure perhaps has more to do with the racialised concept of deployment and disposability, in which those persons travelling from the African continent are not even granted the status of being. The latter category of what Judith Butler and others have called the disposability of bodies in infrastructure (2015, 11) would be better thought through the work of Sylvia Wynter on who, or rather what is counted as human, or Achile Mbembe’s Necropolitics: following this with the end of note 1 above. Deployment would also lay the track for a critical reading of Forensic Architecture’s engagement in the space of art — though perhaps only if it is read only as an art work / cannot transform that space — insofar as these subjects and cases could be said to only be deployed as tokens of a generalised state infrastructural violence; that is that that there is a difficulty in fully interfacing the one space (of the event and the event of viewing) with another transformatively — unless that is this is viewed as a subject for consideration by the public (which it is in part). It is in this sense that the event is more of a deployment into the infrastructural milieu of the art space.

  • Timelines

    Timelines

    An area for further research is the use and importance of the timeline as an aesthetic, conceptual and functional device in infrastructural aesthetics. That is where there is an attempt to represent connection, causation and perhaps correlation of infrastructural effects and fields.

    • This might be seen in the construction of an imaginary as a defining or traumatic event unfolds, as with Group Material’s AIDS Timeline.
    • To construct a narrative of events from within a field of information which is not yet assembled, or which is assembled to convey a particular version of events, as it is used by Forensic Architecture in works such as the Turner Prize exhibition, The Long Duration of a Split Second.
    ‘The Long Duration of a Split Second’, displayed at Tate Britain for the 2018 Turner Prize (Tate Photography / Matt Greenwood)
    • In the practices of reverse design briefs, re-structuring decision-making processes and effects of decisions.
    • Or in tracing how institutions navigate their context, as with ARTNEWS’s timeline of the Whitney’s reaction to the Safariland controversy.

    https://hyperallergic.com/492293/tessa-hulls-guided-by-ghosts-santa-cruz-museum-of-art-and-history/